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Abstract The aim of this paper is to critically examine
David Shaw, Wybo Dondorp, and Guido de Wert’s argu-
ments in favour of the procurement of human organs from
human/nonhuman-primate chimeras, specifically from
great-ape/human chimeras. My main claim is that their
arguments fail and are in need of substantial revision. To
prove this I first introduce the topic, and then reconstruct
Shaw et al.’s position and arguments. Next, I show that
Shaw et al.: (1) failed to properly apply the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles; (2) neglected species overlap-
ping cases in their ethical assessment; (3) ignored the ethics
literature on borderline persons; and (4) misunderstood
McMahan’s two-tiered moral theory. These mistakes ren-
der an important part of their conclusions either false or
problematic to the point that they would no longer endorse
them. Finally I will briefly mention a possible multipolar
solution to the human organ shortage problem that would
reduce the need for chimeras’ organs.
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Introduction
A chimera, in biological sciences, is an organism which at
cellular level is composed from at least two different sets of
cells, which originated in genetically diverse organisms.
Chimeras can be divided in two broad groups: primary
chimeras and secondary chimeras. ‘‘Primary chimæras are
formed by mixing together two early embryos, or an early
embryo with isolated embryonic cell types obtained from a
different embryo or cultured stem cell line. The resulting
chimæra has cells of different origins, in many tissues.
Secondary chimæras are formed experimentally by trans-
planting (or grafting) cells or tissues into animals at later
stages of development, including late fetal stages, post-
natal or even adult animals. The donor cells are only pre-
sent in a few tissues’’ (The Academy of Medical Sciences
2011, 18–19). It should be emphasised that the number,
origin of the cells, and the timing of the mixing could
produce very different outcomes in respect of the kinds of
capacities a chimera could possess.
There are interspecific chimeras and intraspecific chi-
meras. Intraspecific chimeras are those where the sets of
cells that make up the organism belong to the same bio-
logical species. For example, a human chimera can be
created when two non-monozygotic early embryos fuse
completely and grow into one body. The resulting entity is
an organism that at cellular level is a ‘patchwork’ of both
sets of human cells (Tippett 1983). Interspecific chimeras
are those where the sets of cells that make up the organism
belong to different biological species. For example, a goat/
sheep chimera can be created by combining blastomeres
from four-cell goat embryos with blastomeres from four-
cell sheep embryos, the resulting entity is an organism that
at cellular level is a ‘patchwork’ of goat cells and sheep
cells (Fehilly et al. 1984).
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Intraspecific nonhuman/nonhuman chimeras and inter-
specific human/nonhuman chimeras (henceforth, HNH-
chimeras) are used both in biological research that aims at
improving, or maintaining, human health and in research
that aims at advancing our understanding of various bio-
logical mechanisms and processes. For example, mouse-
human chimeras have been used in the research of human
haematopoiesis; development and function of the immune
system; infectious diseases; autoimmunity; cancer; human
cell development, maturation and migration; and regener-
ative medicine (Shultz et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2014; Sun
et al. 2007; Tam and Rossant 2003; Lapidot 2001). HNH-
chimeras have also been proposed as possible tools for
creating vaccines against deadly diseases such as malaria,
dengue, Hepatitis B, HIV and Hepatitis C (Davis and
Stanley 2003; Sacci Jr. et al. 2006; Legrand et al. 2009;
Bhan et al. 2010).
In recent work David Shaw, Wybo Dondorp, Niels
Geijsen, and Guido de Wert have examined, from an eth-
ical and legal position, the procurement, for human trans-
plantation purposes, of human organs created within HNH-
chimeras. In one paper Shaw examined the legal status of
creating HNH-chimeras for obtaining human organs under
Swiss legislation; in another, Shaw, Dondorp, Geijsen, and
de Wert assessed the ethical issues surrounding the pro-
curement of human organs from human/pig chimeras; and
in a final paper Shaw, Dondorp, and de Wert assessed the
ethical issues surrounding the procurement of human
organs obtained from human/nonhuman-primate chimeras
(Shaw 2014; Shaw et al. 2014a, b). This philosophical
research stems, in part, from recent advances in induced
pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) research, and the ad hoc cre-
ation of solid organs within intraspecific and interspecific
chimeras (Kobayashi et al. 2010; Isotani et al. 2011; Usui
et al. 2012; Matsunari et al. 2013; Kobayashi et al. 2014;
Rashid et al. 2014).
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the argu-
ments that have been advanced by David Shaw, Wybo
Dondorp, and Guido de Wert in favour of the procurement
of human organs obtained from human/nonhuman-primate
chimeras, specifically from great-ape/human chimeras.
There are two important reasons for examining such
arguments. First, for those that hold that there are degrees
of moral status, based upon cognitive capacities,1 the ethics
of using great apes for medical research that aims at ben-
efiting humans is a topic that merits special attention.
Second, the ethics of using chimeras for their human
organs is a topic that warrants notice in the medical ethics
literature at this point given recent developments in bio-
logical sciences. For example, in a recent paper
Madhusudana Girija Sanal has sketched a road map for
how to create a transplantable human liver within a
chimpanzee/human chimera (Sanal 2011).
My claim is that the arguments that these authors have
advanced fail to support their conclusions, and thus they
are in need of substantial revision. In order to prove this
first I present a detailed reconstruction of Shaw et al.’s
arguments. Secondly, and relying on a cognitive capacities
account of moral status, I show that Shaw et al. committed
major errors: (1) not properly applying the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles; (2) not including species over-
lapping cases in their ethical assessment; (3) ignoring the
ethics literature on borderline persons; and (4) misunder-
standing McMahan’s two-tiered moral theory. Finally I
will mention a possible multipolar solution to the human
organ shortage problem that would reduce the need for
HNH-chimeras’ organs.
Human organs, nonhuman animal research,
and moral status
Shaw et al. start their inquiry, in Using Non-Human Pri-
mates to Benefit Humans: Research and Organ Trans-
plantation, by bringing forward a well-known fact about
the current status of human organ transplantation: there is a
scarcity of human organs. This in turn means two things:
(1) that many people that are currently affected by fatal
illnesses that can only be treated by organ transplanta-
tion—to a full or less extent—will die waiting for an organ,
and (2) that many people in need of an organ will experi-
ence pain and suffering while waiting for it. For example,
in the UK three people die every day due to the shortage of
transplantable organs; and in United States thirty people
die every day, or are removed from the waiting list due to
being too ill to receive a transplant (Humphreys 2014; NHS
2014).
There are several courses of action that can be taken in
order to increase the number of human organs available for
transplantation: (1) changing from an opt-in donation sys-
tem to a default opt-out donation system, (2) creating
incentives for people to donate their organs after their
death, (3) creating incentives for people to make live organ
donations, (4) making after-death organ donation obliga-
tory, and (5) creating educational campaigns to increase the
number of organ donations. In addition to these proposals
there are five alternative strategies, which do not require
‘human’ donation as such: (6) the creation of in vitro
organs using scaffolds, (7) 3-D printing of human organs,
(8) xenotransplantation, (9) the creation of mechanical
organs and (10) chimera based organ transplantation.
As I have previously stated, Shaw et al. decided to
explore the last possibility in part because of recent




scientific breakthroughs in chimera research. Of all the
possible kinds of HNH-chimeras that could be created for
obtaining human organs they focus on two: pig/human
chimeras and human/nonhuman-primate chimeras.2 Their
selection is not arbitrary: those chimeras are considered to
be the best possible biological candidates for the creation
of transplantable human organs.
Before moving forwards two things should be made
clear about the current state of this research. First, the
creation of human solid organs within HNH-chimeras has
not been accomplished.3 Second, there are still substantial
technical hurdles that must be overcome in order for the
creation of transplantable solid human organs to be feasi-
ble. Given these facts Shaw et al.’s discussion assumes, ex
hypothesis, that this research will be successful and thus
that the technical hurdles will be overcome. Assuming the
former evades issues of risk and harm, due to imperfect
research, but it allows them to focus on the morality of
killing HNH-chimeras for their human organs. Throughout
the rest of the paper I will also assume that this research
will be successful.
After acknowledging that human organs for transplan-
tation are a scarce resource, and assuming that human
organs from chimeras will be available, Shaw et al. turn
their attention to animal research. They point out that
nonhuman animal research, for human health purposes, is
carried out all around the world; and that the present day
moral justification for doing so is that its aims (i.e. the
improvement and maintenance of people’s health) are so
important that, in principle, they trump over all nonhuman
animals’ interests (e.g. avoiding pain, being comfortable,
staying alive). Two caveats should be mentioned. First, and
I will return to this point in the section ‘‘The Case Against
Killing Great-Ape/Human Chimeras for Their Organs’’,
there are morally relevant distinctions between killing
certain animals and killing others. Second, this is not to say
that all medical research that employs nonhuman animals
can be morally justified.
When questioned about how nonhuman animal research
should be carried out Shaw et al. appeal to the well-
established principle of ‘3 Rs’ (replacement, reduction and
refinement) which, according to them, in turn is grounded
in two other principles. ‘‘The 3 Rs are in turn based on two
key principles: proportionality and subsidiarity. These
state, respectively, that any use of animals for research
must be proportional to the prospective benefit, and that
animals should only be used when no reasonable alterna-
tive is available’’ (Shaw et al. 2014a, 573).
The normative force of the proportionality and subsidiarity
principles, when applied to nonhuman animal research, in turn
relies, at least in part, on a theory of moral status. Such a theory
should be able to explain why it is morally distinct to use, for
research purposes, certain nonhuman animals rather than
normal adult human beings. In their paper Shaw et al. do not
explicitly endorse a particular theory of moral status, but it can
be inferred that they are adopting a non-speciesist cognitive
capacities account. This is supported by the fact that they
reject an anthropocentric account of moral status (being a
member of the Homo sapiens species is a necessary or suffi-
cient condition for possessing moral status), that they accept
that certain nonhuman animals possess moral status (sentience
being a sufficient condition for possessing it, given that it is a
sufficient condition for possessing experiential welfare), and
also that they appear to align themselves (Shaw et al. 2014a,
574) with Singer’s definition of personhood [a person is a
‘‘rational and self-conscious being’’ (Singer 1993, 87)]. If this
is correct then it is safe to assume that they would accept that
the creatures with most moral worth are persons, after them
sentient beings and lastly (and if possible) non-sentient
creatures.
Border-line cases and animal experimentation
Shaw et al. maintain that even when a cognitive capacities
account of moral status can be used to determine the moral
permissibility of most nonhuman animal research there are
‘border-line cases’ where it cannot provide a ‘clear-cut’
answer. For example, is it morally permissible to carry on
painful and destructive research in a nonhuman primate
that has the relevant psychological capacities to a slightly
lower degree than a human person? Confronted with such
‘border-line cases’ Shaw et al. quote McMahan’s ‘Time-
Relative Interest Account’ as a possible alternative expla-
nation of why harming nonhuman animals with slightly
less psychological capacities than human persons is less
objectionable than harming human persons. They cite the
following paragraph:
The Time-Relative Interest Account offers an expla-
nation of why the killing of animals is less seriously
objectionable than the killing of persons. Because the
psychological capacities of animals are significantly
less well developed than those of persons, the range
of goods accessible to them is narrower and the
degree of psychological unity within their lives is
less. They therefore have a weaker time-relative
interest in continuing to live than a person normally
does. (McMahan 2003, 204)
2 Even when it is possible that human organs could be created within
other HNH-chimeras, for example elephant/human chimeras or
mouse/human chimeras, it is important to notice that the anatomical
structure of the human body restricts the ‘type’ of organs that could be
used for transplantation.
3 Here ‘HNH-chimera’ should be understood as a chimera predom-
inantly constituted by nonhuman components and with only ‘a few’
human cells.
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After citing this paragraph, Shaw et al. assert that the
sliding scale nature of McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest
Account also cannot tell us if the use, for research
purposes, of nonhuman animals with slightly less psycho-
logical capacities than human persons is morally justified.
Therefore, for them, a cognitive capacities account of
moral status and McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest
Account are unable to show where the ‘cut-off’ between
morally permissible and impermissible research should be
(Shaw et al. 2014a, 574). This ‘cut-off’ is of paramount
prominence for Shaw et al.’s discussion about killing
human/nonhuman-primate chimeras for their organs,
because, as they accept, some nonhuman primates in fact
possess only slightly fewer psychological capacities than
human persons (the most prominent example being great
apes) and thus belong to the ‘grey area’ between persons
and non-persons. Finally, it is important to emphasise, for
reasons that will become clear afterwards, that Shaw et al.
only cite McMahan’s previous paragraph.
Once they have pointed out the supposed sliding scale
problem of both accounts they move on and claim that the
consensus on the use of nonhuman primates—which,
depending on the species, may or may not be in a per-
sonhood ‘grey area’—for research that benefits human
health is that their use is necessary and justified (Shaw
et al. 2014a, 575). The scientific rationale behind this is
that nonhuman primates are biologically the most similar to
humans and they offer the most accurate nonhuman animal
model.
Even when a scientific rationale is provided, Shaw et al.
need to further morally justify the use, for research purposes,
of nonhuman primates with slightly fewer psychological
capacities than human persons (taking for granted that, in
principle, it is morally permissible to sacrifice sentient
beings for the sake of persons). They need to do so because
according to them neither a cognitive capacities account of
moral status nor the Time-Relative Interest Account were
able to tell us if using such nonhuman animals for research is
morally permissible. The way in which Shaw et al. provide
the needed moral justification is by invoking the subsidiarity
and proportionality principles. They assert: ‘‘Given that the
only alternative would be to use humans, the subsidiarity
criterion [for using nonhuman primates for research] is met,
and given the substantial potential benefits of some of the
treatments that may result, the proportionality test is also
met’’ (Shaw et al. 2014a, 574).
It is important to point out that the authors realise that if
they accept a cognitive capacities account of moral status
then the claim that all nonhuman primates have less moral
value than all human beings is in fact incorrect. This is why
they emphasise that ‘‘to the extent that primates actually
meet the criteria for personhood they should be treated as
persons rather than animals, making the proportionality and
subsidiarity principles irrelevant’’ (Shaw et al. 2014a, 574).
Shaw et al. then stress that they ‘‘assume that the current
consensus position is correct, and primates (with the pos-
sible exception of great apes) [emphasis added] are not
persons [and thus can be used for certain research pur-
poses]’’ (Shaw et al. 2014a, 574).
A problem arises here: Shaw et al. do not take into
account, for their ethical assessment, the fact that there are
humans that are not persons, and thus they do not distin-
guish throughout their text between human persons and
human nonpersons. In the section ‘The Case Against
Killing Great-Ape/Human Chimeras for Their Organs’ I
will show why this important omission has serious reper-
cussions for their arguments.
The case for killing human/pig chimeras for their
organs
Once they have examined whether it is morally permissible
to use nonhuman primates for research that benefits human
health and found that with the possible exception of great
apes it is justified according to the proportionality and
subsidiarity principles, Shaw et al. query if it would be
morally justified to kill human/pig chimeras for their
human organs. For them the question is easy to answer:
yes. If we accept, they claim, that the use of certain non-
human animals for destructive research is morally justified
when the aims are those of saving human lives or
improving human health, then, by a matter of consistency,
we would also have to accept that, in principle, the use of
human/pig chimeras as organ suppliers is morally justified.
This justification works as long as human lives are saved or
improved by such organs to the same extent that nonhuman
animal research improves and saves human lives (and
taking for granted that such chimeras are not persons).
Shaw et al. also argue that contrary to nonhuman animal
research, that can lead to dead-ends, produce only indirect
benefits, or produce results that are useless for human
health improvement (due to the translational gap between
nonhuman animal research and human research), the use of
human organs that had their origin in human/pig chimeras
would in most cases save at least one human life. This
point is made to reinforce the position that killing human/
pig chimeras for their organs is morally less problematic
than most destructive nonhuman animal research.
While for these authors sacrificing a human/pig chimera
in order to save a human life seems morally unproblematic,
it appears that cases where its killing would only bring an
improvement to someone’s well-being (e.g. reducing the
suffering of dialysis) needs further justification, which
Shaw et al. do not provide. This justification is required
because the fundamental interests of the human/pig chi-
mera must be weighed against the human’s interest of not
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suffering gravely. In this respect McMahan’s Time-Rela-
tive Interest Account may provide the needed justification.
According to it, the ‘badness’ of death is a function of the
lost opportunities of worthwhile life (however this is
defined: preference satisfaction, pleasure, etc.), considered
from a whole-lifetime perspective but proportionally
adjusted to the strength of one’s psychological unity over
time—the more psychological unity over time one has the
more death harms one. If this is the case, we can say that a
human person’s interest in not greatly suffering would
trump over the human/pig chimera’s interest in staying
alive if the human person’s time-relative interest in not
suffering is weightier than the chimera’s time-relative
interest in remaining alive. While is difficult to precisely
calculate the amount of pain a person should be experi-
encing for it to be morally permissible to kill such chimera,
I think that a human person’s great suffering would justify
the painless killing of a human/pig chimera.
While the sacrifice of human/pig chimeras for the
procuration of human organs for saving or lessening great
suffering in human persons seems morally justifiable, the
morality of procuring human organs from human/nonhu-
man-primates needs further elaboration.
The case for killing human/nonhuman-primates
chimeras for their organs
In order to investigate the morality of killing human/non-
human-primate chimeras for their organs, Shaw et al. test
whether such cases meet the proportionality and sub-
sidiarity principles. They take this course of action
because, as stated previously, they consider that a cognitive
capacities account of moral status and McMahan’s Time-
Relative Interest Account cannot provided a ‘clear-cut’
answer to the question of whether it is morally permissible
to kill beings that possesses slightly less mental capacities
than humans.
For them, killing human/nonhuman-primate chimeras
for their organs is proportional given the potential direct
benefits that would be conferred to humans.4 Such benefits
are not only measured in the number of saved lives, but
also in the reduction of suffering due to the shortening of
waiting time that elapses between someone needing an
organ, and her receiving it. Once they have accepted this
they wonder if the distinction between greater and lesser
apes is morally relevant:
The fact that great apes [emphasis added] might be
necessary due for organ creation also raises the
question of whether the distinction between lesser
and great apes is relevant in this context. Most pri-
mates used in research, and all used in the UK, are
smaller primates. While these could be used for organ
production (especially for children), bigger primates
are more likely to be appropriate donors [emphasis
added]. (…) While the creation of human organs
inside primates appears to meet the proportionality
criterion (with the possible exception of great apes)
[emphasis added], the subsidiarity principle raises
further questions. (Shaw et al. 2014a, 576)
Justifying the killing of human/nonhuman-primate chi-
meras for their human organs, in terms of the subsidiarity
principle, is more challenging because it must be shown
that there are no reasonable alternatives for obtaining the
much needed organs. To do this Shaw et al. first identify
two possible readings of the subsidiarity principle, a strict
reading and a permissive reading, and then they investigate
their normative force. The strict reading asserts that if there
is a reasonable alternative to the use of chimeras then we
should not use them. The permissive reading affirms that
using chimeras is permissible if non-problematic alterna-
tives have not been established.
Once they have identified these two readings, Shaw
et al. argue that even when the strict reading is accurate, in
the description of the states of the world, it lacks normative
force for the people who will die without an organ trans-
plantation. It lacks such force because it does not follow
from the fact that there are other reasonable possible
courses of action that they can in fact be followed: ‘‘for the
specific people who will die soon without an organ there
really is no alternative, suggesting that the restrictive
reading of the subsidiarity principle is too strict’’ (Shaw
et al. 2014a, 576). Given this Shaw et al. conclude that the
permissive reading of the subsidiarity principle should be
embraced. Therefore killing human/nonhuman-primate
chimeras for their organs is morally justifiable, because
there is no real reasonable non-problematic alternative
available.
At this point Shaw et al. make a clarification in respect
to what they think are justifiable aims for using human/
nonhuman-primate chimeras’ human organs: ‘‘it could also
be argued that primates should only be sacrificed to create
organs when it’s necessary to save life [emphasis added]
rather than to improve quality of life. While lessening the
suffering of dialysis for kidney patients, for example, is a
good goal, it is not clear that it is worth sacrificing a great
ape for; in contrast, such a sacrifice seems more appro-
priate if a human will die without it [emphasis added]’’
(Shaw et al. 2014a, 577).
There are two ideas here that merit unpacking. The first
is that human/nonhuman-primate chimeras should only be
killed when otherwise a human would die. In such an
4 It is important, again, to stress that Shaw et al. do not distinguish
between human persons and human nonpersons and thus they only
talk about benefits conferred to humans.
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assertion it is implied that human/nonhuman-primate chi-
meras’ time-relative interest in staying alive trumps over
the human’s time-interest in not suffering. Two things
should be further noted here. First, these authors do not
address whether a specific degree of suffering (e.g.
unbearable suffering) would merit killing human/nonhu-
man-primate chimeras. Second, they also do not address
the question of whether human/nonhuman-primate chi-
meras should be killed for the sake of the health of human
nonpersons, or humans with the same mental capacities as
those of the chimeras providing the organs.
The second idea is that for Shaw et al. it would be
morally justifiable to sacrifice a great-ape/human chimera
for procuring human organs when a human would die
without them. It is important to highlight that even when
Shaw et al. had previously accepted that it is possible that
great apes, and in this case great-ape/human chimeras, are
in fact persons they have now asserted that they are sac-
rificable when doing so would save any human live. The
idea that great apes’ lives are sacrificable when the life of a
human is at stake is a common one, as McMahan has
pointed out: ‘‘Most people believe that it would be per-
missible, and perhaps morally required, to kill an adult
chimpanzee if the transplantation of its organs could save
the life of an adult human being’’ (McMahan 2009, 584).
To sum up, Shaw et al. defended that killing human/
nonhuman-primate chimeras for their organs would only be
morally justified when such actions in fact would save a
human’s life. They defended this by employing the propor-
tionality and subsidiarity principles, while noting that neither
a cognitive capacities account of moral status nor McMa-
han’s Time-Relative Interest Account could provide a ‘clear-
cut’ answer to the morality of killing human/nonhuman-
primate chimeras for their organs. This conclusion also
applies, in terms of the subsidiarity principle, to cases of
killing great-ape/human chimeras for their human organs.
The case against killing great-ape/human chimeras
for their organs
Shaw et al. have argued that the subsidiarity principle
would allow killing great-ape/human chimeras for their
organs when doing so would save a human’s life, and they
have left open to further investigation (with the phrase
‘with the possible exception of great apes’) whether the
proportionality principle would also allow for such killing.
In this section I will show two things: (1) contrary to what
Shaw et al. assert the subsidiarity and proportionality
principles in fact would not allow killing great-ape/human
chimeras for their organs, and (2) defending the killing of
human/nonhuman-primate chimeras for their organs is
more complicated than they appreciate.
It could be argued at this point that the interpretation I
am offering of Shaw et al.’s position is uncharitable, given
that they do not explicitly endorse the killing of great-ape/
human chimeras for their organs. To this possible rejoinder
I offer two rebuttals. The first is that Shaw et al.’s paper
discusses the killing of creatures with slightly less psy-
chological capacities than human persons, which is how we
would define great apes. The second is that Shaw et al.
accept that there are proper motives for killing a great ape
(e.g. saving a human life) and that there are other inap-
propriate motives for doing so (e.g. increasing someone’s
quality of life).
Revisiting moral status
To understand where the problem lies with Shaw et al.’s
conclusion we need to remember that they appealed to the
subsidiarity and proportionality principles after they
‘found’ that a cognitive capacities account of moral status
and McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Account could not
tell us, in a ‘clear-cut’ fashion, if it would be morally
permissible to kill human/nonhuman-primate chimeras
(including great-ape/human chimeras) for their human
organs. In order to clear things up we need to go back to the
discussion about moral status.
To state that an entity possesses moral status is to realise
that ‘‘in its own right and for its own sake, it can give us
reason to do things such as not destroy it or help it [emphasis
in the original]’’ (Kamm 2007, 229). Such action guiding
reasons are based, at least partly, on the entities’ interests, or
time-relative interests. This in turn means that our consid-
eration of an entity that possesses moral status should not be
primarily conceived in terms of indirect duties towards
ourselves, or duties towards other moral agents.
Among the beings with moral status there is a subset that
we call persons. Persons are considered to be a distinct set
of beings based on the specific cluster of capacities that
they possess. The capacities that are commonly associated
with personhood are: autonomy, rationality, self-aware-
ness, linguistic competence, sociability, moral agency, and
the capacity for intentional action. Providing a compre-
hensive list of necessary and sufficient capacities for per-
sonhood is unfeasible, because of the way in which they
relate with each other. As DeGrazia has pointed out,
someone is a person when she possesses the aforemen-
tioned capacities in a clustered way, not analysable in
terms of one specific subset, to the point that suffices for a
complex form of consciousness to be. To be a person one
needs to possess enough of these capacities ‘‘where
‘enough’ takes account both of how many of these prop-
erties are instantiated and of the degree to which each is
instantiated’’ (DeGrazia 2007, 320). Someone that is cap-
able of normative self-governance (i.e. that is capable of
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reflecting upon her beliefs and actions and changing them
accordingly) is taken to be a paradigmatic person under a
cognitive capacities account of personhood.
The distinction between persons and nonpersons becomes
relevant when they have conflicting interests. For example,
in the transplantation cases that we have been discussing (i.e.
the human/pig chimera cases), the interest that a person
possesses in remaining alive is in direct conflict with the
interest that a nonperson chimera has in remaining alive. One
way of dealing with such conflict of interests is to weigh them
according to the Time-Relative Interest Account and to
resolve in favour of that that possesses stronger interests. If
we did so we would have to resolve the conflict in favour of
the person, because death deprives her of a broader range of
goods than those that the nonperson would be deprived of.5
It is important to bear in mind that having moral status
or being a person is species neutral. This means that from a
normative stand point it should be regarded as irrelevant to
which biological species an entity belongs when assessing
if it possesses, or not, moral status, and if it is, or is not, a
person. It is true that there are biological species whose
members regularly possess some cluster of these capacities,
but this does not mean that there cannot be members of this
species that lack enough of the capacities to have moral
status or to be persons (e.g. human foetuses or the con-
genitally severely cognitively impaired). This clarification
about moral status and personhood is important because
until recent times it was considered that all humans had
more moral worth than all nonhuman animals and that only
humans had the requisite capacities for personhood.
The moral status of great apes
The question that we need to answer now is if great apes
are persons, and thus if the strength of their interests is the
same as those of human persons. Before advancing any
further let’s remember that when we talk about great apes
we are talking specifically about chimpanzees, bonobos,
gorillas, and orang-utans. There are really strong indica-
tions that great apes in fact possess many of the charac-
teristics that we associate with personhood.
Among the empirical evidence that we possess for
asserting that great apes possess many personhood-relevant
properties6 is the following: chimpanzees use tools such as
stones to crack nuts, sticks to reach for insects, and moss
for sponges. All great apes perform intentional actions and
participate in social manipulation. All of them are bodily
self-aware, and this self-awareness is revealed prominently
in their imitation of bodily gestures and use of televised
images of their out-of-view arms to reach concealed
objects. They are capable of using mirrors to inspect
otherwise imperceptible markings. Great apes also have
social structures and they establish long-term relationships,
dominance hierarchies, and allegiances. They shift alle-
giances, have knowledge of their position within a group,
and expectations of others’ behaviours in accordance with
their position in the group. All great apes have a rudi-
mentary culture, they transmit, from one generation to
another, novel behaviours such as knowledge of which
leaves can be used for certain medicinal purposes, how to
create certain types of tools and how to construct nests.
Furthermore, there is evidence of proto-moral agency
among certain great apes, the strongest of which is altru-
istic actions that do not appear either to be conditioned or
instinctive. Finally there is at least one bonobo, one gorilla
and one orang-utan that after intensive human language
training were able to acquire and understand, to some
extent, human spoken and sign language.
Now, even when great apes possess all these capacities
they are not as linguistically competent as normal adult
humans are, and they are not as capable of normative self-
governance as normal adult humans are. This being the
case, and under a strict interpretation of what personhood
is, we should agree that great apes are not paradigmatic
persons.7 Even when this is so we should acknowledge that
great apes are borderline persons, just as David DeGrazia
has forcefully and satisfactorily defended (DeGrazia 1997,
2005, 2007). What does it mean to say that great apes are
borderline persons? It means, in the first place, that great
apes inhabit the grey area between paradigmatic persons
and nonpersons. They are beings with slightly fewer psy-
chological capacities than normal humans. It is important,
at this point, to remember that for Shaw et al. it is only if
primates meet the criteria for personhood that the propor-
tionality and subsidiarity principles should be regarded as
irrelevant (Shaw et al. 2014a, 574). This further affirms that
for them the proportionality principle in fact would allow
for the killing of great-ape/human chimeras for their human
organs, just as the subsidiarity principle does.
Before moving on we need to address the more general
question of how moral respect relates to possessed cogni-
tive capacities. If we accept, just as Shaw et al. seem to do,
that moral status follows from certain cognitive capacities
and that in the natural world beings exist within a contin-
uum of cognitive capacities (that go from none at all to
personhood related capacities) then we have to accept
5 In the following section I discuss how conflict of interests between
persons and borderline persons should be resolved.
6 The empirical evidence supporting this claim is cited at length by
DeGrazia (1997, 2005, 2007) and Ravelingien et al. (2006).
7 DeGrazia defends that the three great apes that are linguistically
competent in fact are fully-fledged persons. In what follows I will not
discuss the possibility of linguistically competent great apes or great-
ape/human chimeras.
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either: (1) that moral consideration should be proportional
to the capacities a being possesses, or (2) that there is a
threshold above which all beings must be treated alike. One
obvious difficulty with a proportional respect approach (in
contrast with a threshold one) is that it accepts differences
in moral worth between persons. For example, because on
this approach moral worth follows from the possession of
more sophisticated capacities, seven year old normal
human children, who have less sophisticated cognitive
capacities than other persons such as eighteen year old
normal humans, could be considered as having less moral
worth. This being the case a two-tiered morality account,
one for persons and the other one for nonpersons, seems
more appropriate (Harris 1985).
In point of fact McMahan, in The Ethics of Killing,
develops and endorses a two-tier account of morality!
According to it a morality of identical respect must hold
among persons, making their killing equally prima facie
wrong, while for nonpersons the Time-Relative Interest
Account should prevail. As he says, when discussing the
morality of late term abortion:
It is important to remember that the Time-Relative
Interest Account is not a complete account of the
morality of killing, but is instead just one component
of the more comprehensive Two-Tiered Account.
According to the Two-Tiered Account, the wrongness
of killing beings who are above the threshold of
respect is governed by a requirement of respect. Thus
even if a person has a very weak time-relative interest
in continuing to live because the amount of good in
prospect for him is quite small, it would nevertheless
be just as wrong to kill him as it would be to kill any
other person, if other things are equal. For his worth
as a person is a function of his intrinsic nature and is
unaffected by the amount of good the future holds in
prospect. It is only in the case of beings that fall
below the threshold of respect that the morality of
killing is governed by the Time-Relative Interest
Account. (McMahan 2003, 276)
The former quote highlights one of the fundamental
problems with Shaw et al.’s paper: by only citing one
paragraph of McMahan’s position, and not contextualizing
it, they present a deeply incorrect version of McMahan’s
moral theory. In actuality McMahan’s two-tiered account is
completely capable of accommodating cases of animals
with slightly less psychological capacities than normal
human adults, as will become clear in the next section.
The morality of killing borderline persons
So far I have only stated that great apes and great-ape/
human chimeras are borderline persons. I now need to
present a convincing case for the following claim: great
apes and great-ape/human chimeras should be treated as
paradigmatic persons. The justification for treating such
creatures as paradigmatic persons is that the gap between
the strength of the interests of persons and the strength of
the interests of borderline persons is so small, and blurred,
that they should be treated alike. This is a level-up solution
to the ‘problem’ of borderline persons. As DeGrazia has
stated:
[O]n any reasonable model of moral status [Unequal
Considerations Model or Unequal Interests Model]
borderline persons – whether human or nonhuman –
have full moral status, or (though this may come to
the same) ought to be regarded as having it. To treat
borderline persons accordingly is to regard them
much as we regard human children: not as substan-
tially autonomous or as having full-fledged moral
agency but as deserving moral protections of full
strength. (DeGrazia 2007, 323)
The conclusion, if we adopt a level-up stance, is that it, in
principle, is morally impermissible to kill human or
nonhuman borderline persons for their organs. Thus: it is
morally impermissible to kill great apes and great-ape/
human chimeras for their organs.
A possible rejoinder which Shaw et al. could advance, is
that in fact borderline persons should be treated according
to McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Account. They could
try to justify this point by stressing that borderline persons’
interests should in fact be treated with slightly less con-
sideration than those of persons, but that that slight dif-
ference allows for their killing. This slight difference
explains why it would be less seriously objectionable to kill
borderlines persons (e.g. great-ape/human chimeras) than
to kill human persons. If Shaw et al. decided to embrace
this position they would be opting for a level-down solu-
tion to the ‘problem’ of borderline persons. While this
position might appear sensible, it has some logical impli-
cations that Shaw et al. should address in order for their
case to be regarded as plausible.
The first implication, from a species neutral perspective
on moral status and personhood, of such a level-down
stance is that this would also mean that all creatures with
the same, or less, psychological capacities than great apes
could be sacrificed for their organs and this would be
morally justifiable. Thus all humans that have the same, or
less, psychological capacities than great apes can be
morally sacrificed for their organs. Among the humans that
could therefore be morally sacrificed are infants, toddlers,
and adults that have less or the same mental capacities than
great apes. Even if Shaw et al. claimed, and we agreed, that
infants and toddlers should not be sacrificed for their
organs because they have the potential to become
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paradigmatic persons, they would have to accept that there
are two sets of cases where humans could be morally
sacrificed for their organs. Cases where a human did not
have the potential to become a paradigmatic or borderline
person, and cases where they only had the potential to
develop to a stage analogous to that of a great ape. For
example, those so congenitally severely cognitively
impaired as to fall within or below the borderline person-
hood threshold.
The second implication is that it would be morally
unjustifiable to sacrifice great-ape/human chimeras for the
sake of human borderline persons, contrary to what Shaw
et al. endorsed. This is because great-ape/human chimeras
and human borderline persons would have time-relative
interests of the same strength. While it would be morally
permissible to kill a great-ape/human chimera for saving
the life of a human person, according to the level-down
position; it would be morally impermissible to kill the
chimera for saving the life of a human borderline person
and even less for saving the life of a human nonperson.
The third implication is that Shaw et al. would have to
accept that instead of waiting a decade, or more, while
scientists develop great-ape/human chimeras whose organs
we could use for transplantation, we should start using
human borderline persons’ organs today! By killing and
using the organs of human borderline persons and non-
persons right away we could avoid the deaths of large
numbers of human persons. Even more so, some of the
resources that we would need for the creation and main-
tenance of the great-ape/human chimeras could be saved,
and repurposed for other morally worthy ends, given that
human borderline persons and nonpersons occur naturally.
At this point Shaw et al. could try to avoid the level-down
problems by relying on a relational account of moral status.
They could claim that the relations that such human bor-
derline persons, and nonpersons, have with their relatives
and those that care for them (i.e. human persons) in fact either
enhance their moral status (Steinbock 2011), or grant them
the moral status of a paradigmatic person (Kittay 2005,
2009). Thus while it would be morally permissible to kill
great-ape/human chimeras for their organs it would not be
morally permissible to kill human borderline persons and
nonpersons for their organs. One difficulty with this
approach is that it does not automatically entail that we
would not be able to harvest organs from all humans that are
borderline persons or nonpersons. It instead implies that it
would only be immoral to harvest organs from humans that
are borderline persons or nonpersons and that have a special
relation with some other person. Thus, all human borderline
persons and nonpersons that are not in such relationships
could in fact be killed for their organs. The second difficulty
is that this same conclusion, regarding special relations,
would apply to great apes and great-ape/human chimeras.
For example, if a person raised, or took care of, a great ape
and established with her a significant relation then the moral
status of this great ape would be modified to the same degree
as that of a borderline human that enters the same type of
relationship with another person. This shows that even an
appeal to a relational account of moral status entails neither a
total prohibition of the killing of human borderline persons
and nonpersons for their organs, nor the complete moral
acceptability of the killing of great-ape/human chimeras for
their human organs.
Shaw et al. could claim that even if human borderline
persons were not in relationships that enhanced their moral
worth it would be inconceivable to take them out of their
homes to be killed for their organs. Even if we accept this, we
can still imagine possible scenarios where we could morally
obtain and kill such human borderline persons, and nonper-
sons, for their organs (if the levelling-down approach were
correct). For example, we could raise abandoned human
borderline persons and nonpersons for such purposes, just as
we would raise great-ape/human chimeras, in a special
location. It is easy to imagine a location where those that
‘take care’ of such humans do so remotely and without
knowing who they are taking care of, and thus do not gen-
erate any significant relation with them. If these conditions
were met then it would be morally unproblematic to kill such
human borderline persons, and nonpersons, for their organs.
The fact that personhood and moral status are species
neutral entails that the conclusions that Shaw et al. happily
apply to great apes and great-ape/human chimeras would
also apply, in principle, to humans that are borderline per-
sons. Confronted with this problem Shaw et al. have either to
accept that it is morally acceptable to kill great apes, great-
ape/human chimeras and some human borderline persons
for their organs, or they would have to reject this proposition.
I think that the authors would endorse the latter stance.
In this section I have tried to show that a hybrid account
of morality can explain why killing borderline persons for
their organs is morally inadmissible. If this is correct then it
follows that Shaw et al.’s appeal to the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles to solve the issue is unwarranted.
I have also shown that Shaw et al. failed to realise an
important implication of adopting a species neutral stance.
This implication is that their conclusions equally apply to
human borderline persons and nonpersons (or some human
borderline persons and nonpersons, if we endorse a rela-
tional account of moral status).
Final remarks
Is it morally permissible to kill nonhuman-primates/human
chimeras’ for their organs? The answer depends on the
cognitive capacities that such chimeras possess. On the one
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hand, if such nonhuman primates have great enough cog-
nitive capacities to classify them as persons, or borderline
persons, then the answer is that, in principle, it is morally
impermissible to kill them for their organs. On the other
hand, if they are not persons, or borderline persons, then
the answer is that it could be permissible to kill them for
their organs. Now, according to a species neutral account
this second statement also entails that certain human
beings, those that are nonpersons, could be morally sacri-
ficed for their organs (e.g. those unloved humans that are
congenitally severely cognitively impaired). Is this correct?
It is what logically follows from the argument. Even if
we accepted a relational account of moral status there
would most probably be certain human nonpersons that
could be morally sacrificed for their organs. It is true that
many will find this option appalling. Is there a way to be
consistent and at the same time reject the use of unloved
human nonpersons as organ sources? I doubt there is to a
full extent: even when this might be the case there is still a
well-known multipolar option that would widely reduce the
need to kill nonpersons (human or otherwise). The multi-
polar option would entail, among other things, adopting
health programmes that promoted healthy lifestyles, a
default opt-out donation system, creating incentives for
people to autonomously make live organ donations, and
substantively investing in research that aimed at the cre-
ation of mechanical organs, 3-D printed human organs and
in vitro organs using scaffolds. In addition to this multi-
polar solution we should also further discuss the ethics of
making after death organ donation mandatory (Harris
2002). All these efforts would bring down the number of
people that would need to rely on killing nonpersons (hu-
man or nonhuman) in order to acquire healthy organs.
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